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Exploring possible impacts of ESI restructuring on DSM 1 
1. Introduction 
This paper explores the possible implications of resbucturing the South African electricity supply 
industry (ESI) on demand-side management (DSM). It also introduces a discussion on how the 
resbucturing process may be designed so as to promote appropriate DSM. Regarding the first 
area of focus, this paper will examine: 
• how resbucturing the ESI may alter different stakeholders' incentives to undertake DSM; 
• how resbucturing the ESI may impact on the kinds of DSM that stakeholders undertake, 
and; 
• how resbucturing the ESI may lead to the disappearance of existing barriers to DSM or 
result in the emergence of new ones. 
After examining four scenarios or phases for the resbucturing of the ESI in South Africa in 
section 2, these issues are discussed in sections 3 and 4. 
Section 5 deals with the second area of focus. It draws on the information in the preceding 
sections to identify some of the trends and therefore some of the issues in the way resbucturing 
is likely to impact on DSM across the different scenarios. This information informs a later paper 
in this series which examines the positioning of DSM in a resbuctured electricity industry and 
makes recommendations to government, the National Electricity Regulator (NER) and Eskom 
on the issue1. Section 6 concludes by summarising the most important DSM implications of ESI 
resbucturing. 
This paper is one of a series emanating from a project aimed at delivering recommendations to 
the government, the National Electricity Regulator (NER) and Eskom on ways to ensure that 
DSM is built into the resbucturing process set to occur in South Africa. The first report in this 
series reviews international experiences of electricity industry resbucturing and the impact these 
have had on DSM programmes. It draws lessons from what has happened in other countries 
that are likely to be relevant as the process of resbucturing the ESI in this country gets under 
way. The second report investigates what barriers are currently inhibiting investment in DSM in 
South Africa faced by municipal distributors, Eskom, and end-use customers; it also looks at 
barriers resulting from government policy and regulation. This report is the third in the series, 
and draws on the first and second reports to evaluate what the implications resbucturing the 
ESI will have for DSM. The fourth and fifth reports make recommendations on governance, 
regulation, funding and institutional arrangements on how to ensure that DSM is well placed in 
the new contexts. 
2. Restructuring the ESI: What are the options? 
Internationally, resbucturing of power industries has involved changes in its ownership and/or 
its strudure.2 The focus of this discussion is primarily on the structure of the industry. The 
overall aim of this section is to provide a context for discussing the likely impact of ESI 
resbucturing on DSM programmes in section 4. 
Soon after the NER was established in 1995, a number of 'task teams' were set up to 
investigate various aspects of the ESI. Among these was the Electricity Market Task T earn, 
whose brief was to 'make recommendations to the NER regarding the need for an electricity 
market in South Africa, as well as the required future sbucture, operation and commercial 
interfaces between the participants in such an electricity market' (NER 1996a). This task team 
examined four possible ways of organising the electricity industry: monopoly, single purchaser, 
wholesale competition and retail competition (these models are described fully by Hun~ and 
Shuttleworth (1996) and reproduced in Clark (1999)). Although it did not make a specific 
See Clark (2000). 
2 See, for instance, Clark (1999). 
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recommendation as to which model should be adopted, it is evident that the task team 
favoured establishing a structure compatible with wholesale competition in the medium term. 
The industry models outlined in the Electricity Market Task Team's report have strongly 
influenced the debate both around the restructuring of the electricity distribution industry (ERIC 
1996) and the government's long-term vision for the electricity industry, as set out in the White 
Paper on Energy Policy (DME 1998). 
The remainder of this section draws on these and other sources to outline: 
• the current structure of the ESI ('status quo' scenario); 
• the structure of the ESI after the proposed rationalisation of the EDI is complete ('REDs' 
scenario); 
• the likely structure of the ESI should wholesale competition be introduced ('wholesale 
competition' scenario); and 
• the likely structure of ESI should retail competition be introduced ('retail competition' 
scenario).3 
2.1 The current structure of the ESI: 'status quo' scenario 




Own generators Municipal generation 
Figure 1: Current structure of the ESI: status quo scenario 
Figure 1 illustrates that the ESI in South Africa is currently dominated by Eskom, a state-owned 
utility that has recently been corporatised. Eskom is also in the process of ring-fencing its 
various activities into separate entities dealing with generation, transmission, distribution and a 
range of auxiliary services (some of which have been lodged within 'Eskom Enterprises'. 
The electricity generation industry is presently dominated by Eskom Generation, which 
produces approximately 95.1% of the electricity generated for resale in South Africa. The 
remaining 4.9% is generated by seven municipalities for distribution to their customers, as well 
as by a small number of companies which generate electricity for their own use. Eskom 
Generation is therefore virtually the monopoly generator of electricity for public use (NER 
1998). Eskom Transmission operates nearly the entire transmission network which transmits 
electricity from power stations to all parts of the country, as well as to and from neighbouring 
countries (NER 1998). 
3 Note that these scenarios should not be confused with the different phases for restructuring the EDI 
described in the Department of Minerals and Energy's Call for Proposals on the Electricity Distribution 
Industry Restructuring Project (DME 1999). These phases describe a possible way to manage the 
transition within the distribution industry from the current situation to the formation of REDs, and 
therefore focus only on the formation of REDs and do not deal with the introduction of wholesale 
competition, nor retail competition. In addition, they focus on possible institutionaVcompany structures for 
the EDI and the associated ownership implications, rather than the relationship between generation, 
transmission and distribution as integrated sub-sectors of the ESI. 
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The distribution of electricity is undertaken by Eskom Distribution and approximately 380 
licensed municipal distributors. Collectively the municipalities serve about 56% of all customers 
and distribute 42% of the electricity supplied to end-users (NER 1998).4 Generally, 
municipalities serve customers in the areas under their jurisdiction. The municipal distributors 
vary greatly in size, geographic spread, customer density and base, as well as managerial 
capacity. Consequently the financial health of municipal electricity undertakings varies greatly. 
Eskom Distribution serves the rest of the customers, and has customers spread throughout the 
country. Most very large industrial customers are served directly by Eskom Distribution. All the 
municipal distributors also purchase electricity from Eskom Distribution. 
As noted above, the NER was established as the regulatory authority over the whole electricity 
supply industry in 1995. Shortly after its establishment it required all generators, transmitters 
and distributors of electricity to apply for licences to undertake these activities. Permanent 
licenses were issued for generation and transmission on the basis that these sectors were 
operating fairly effectively and efficiently. However, the NER elected to issue only temporary 
licenses to electricity distributors because in its view there were serious questions regarding 
many municipalities' ability to meet electrification targets, set equitable tariffs and remain 
financially solvent. There is little evidence to suggest that the situation has changed significantly. 
It is generally acknowledged that the EDI is in a state of crisis and in urgent need of 
restructuring. 5 The status quo model illustrated is therefore set to change in the near future. The 
scenarios that follow can either be regarded as alternative end-points to the imminent 
restructuring process or as successive steps towards an ultimate end-point {see discussion in 
section 3.2). 
2.2 Distribution restructuring: the 'REDs' scenario 
The financial and technical problems being experienced by many municipal distributors and the 
subsequent refusal of the NER to grant them permanent licenses has set the stage for the 
restructuring of the EDI.6 However, the debate as to the desired outcome of the restructuring 
process has been hotly contested, with the result that progress is only now being made despite 
the problems being identified a number of years ago. After considering the input of various 
forums, working groups and committees, the government set out its vision for the restructuring 
the EDI in the 1998 White Paper on Energy Policy. Since then this vision has been further 
debated and refined. Current indications are that most outstanding issues, e.g. the extent of 
municipalities' authority over the distribution industry, have been finalised. The government 
has also appointed technical advisors to plan the actual process of restructuring. To this end the 
government has also approved: 
the restructuring of the EDI through the 'EDI Holdings' model as a transitional 
{interim) institutional mechanism before financially viable, independent regional 
electricity distributors {REDs) are established. The REDs will be subsidiaries of the 
EDI Holdings company until independence. The 'EDI Holdings' model requires 
that the Distribution division of Eskom be separated completely from Eskom and 
be merged, on the one hand, with municipalities to form a separate national EDI 
Holdings Company. The EDI Holdings company will be grouped into regional 
areas that will coincide with the predetermined RED boundaries. On the other 
hand, the licensed distributors and municipalities in the specific area will also be 
grouped, according to predetermined RED boundaries. {DME 1999: 6) 
Figure 2 outlines the proposed structure of the ESI after the restructuring of the ED I. Obviously, 
the actual restructuring process will involve a number of interim steps or phases, but these do . 
not need to be discussed in this context (see DME 1999: 6-8). The dotted arrows in the figure 




There are calculation errors in the table "Ovetview of Electricity Sales" NER 1998: 12. 
See, for instance, ERIC (1996); DME (1998) and Barberton (1998). 
Initially it was hoped that the NER would be able to use the licensing process to consolidate the EDI, but 
this proved not to be possible. Hence the current restructuring process. 
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have information. For instance, we do not have any information on the fate of municipal power 
stations in the restructured environment. Will they be closed down, incorporated into the 
appropriate REDs, allowed to operate as independent power producers (IPPs) or transferred to 
Eskom Generation? 
It is possible that some generation licenses may be allocated to IPPs as part of the restructuring 
of the EDI. This would be one way of separating municipal generation and distribution interests 
so as to allow consolidation of the EDI into REDs. The government may also allow a number of 
small IPPs (most likely co-generators) to license during the restructuring of the EDI. However, 
the market into which these IPPs will be selling is likely to be rather restricted, i.e. either their 
local RED or the national transmission system- acting as a single purchaser. It is unlikely that 
these IPPs will be allowed to wheel electricity across the transmission grid at this stage in the 
restructuring process, if for no other reason than the systems required to manage such a market 
are not in place. Such developments in the electricity generation industry would be in line with 
proposals set out in the White Paper on Energy Policy, in which the government indicates that 
'the entry of multiple players into the generation market will be encouraged ... [i]nitially ... by 
obliging the national transmission system to publish National Electricity Regulator approved 
tariffs for the purchase of co-generated and independently generated electricity on the basis of 
full avoided costs'7 (DME 1999: 42). 
It should also be noted that the number of REDs illustrated in Figure 2 does not reflect the 
actual number to be set up. As far as is known, the government's current position is still that 
EDI should be consolidated 'into the maximum number of yet to be determined, financially 
viable and independent regional distributors' (press release by the Minister of Minerals and 
Energy, 6 March 1997, see also DME 1999: 6). One of the tasks of the technical advisor is to 
determine the appropriate number of REDs and their exact boundaries (DME 1999: 12). 






Figure 2: The ESI after distribution has been rationalised: the 'REDs' scenario 
Figure 2 shows that in the REDs scenario, the generation industry will continue to be 
dominated by Eskom Generation. Eskom Transmission will continue to operate the national 
grid. It is also expected that Eskom Transmission will act as a 'single purchaser' of electricity 
from Eskom Generation and possibly other generators such as municipal generators and the 
small number of companies that have 'own generation'. This will introduce a very limited level 
of competition into the electricity generation industry. Eskom Transmission will on-sell this 
electricity to REDs for distribution to end-users. It is not yet clear whether certain key industrial 
customers will be allowed to purchase electricity directly from Eskom Transmission. 'The 
government's view is that a study is required to develop a set of differential policies and criteria 
which would allow choice of supply to those industrial customers where this is a critical issue', 
i.e. impaets on their comparative advantage and profitability. This is something the above-
mentioned technical advisors are required to examine (DME 1999: 13). 
The restructuring of the EDI is expected to result in the consolidation of existing Eskom 
Distribution and municipal distribution interests into the 'maximum number of financially viable 
7 For a critique of economic sustainability of this policy see Barberton (2000). 
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REDs'. ·As noted above, the exact number of REDs to be set up is still to be determined. REDs 
will purchase electricity from Eskom Transmission. Whether they will be allowed to purchase it 
from other sources as well is not yet clear. If they are, it will introduce a measure of wholesale 
competition into the ESI which would then be developed in the next stage of restructuring (see 
below). 
REDs will have both an exclusive right and an obligation to supply all end-users in the areas 
under their jurisdiction. Whether this exclusive franchise will include all key industrial customers 
is not yet clear. If it does not, the key industrial customers are only likely to be allowed to 
purchase directly from Eskom Transmission and not from other REDs. In other words the 
'choice supplier' mentioned is likely to be restricted to a choice between the local RED and 
Eskom Transmission. 
2.3 Introduction of wholesale competition: 'wholesale competition' 
scenario 
Once the REDs are in place, the next logical step in the restructuring process would be to 
introduce wholesale competition at the generation end of the ESI. Recently it has been 
suggested that it might not be necessary to wait until the EDI is consolidated before competition 
is introduced into the wholesale market. 
Figure 3: The ESI with wholesale competition: the 'wholesale competition' scenario 
As shown in Figure 3, a wholesale market would be one in which a number of generators 
compete to sell electricity to a power exchange and for the right to supply distributors (the 
REDs) and key industrial customers. Such a market would be very different from the 'single 
purchaser market' noted above, in that it would involve generators bidding to sell electricity at 
competitive prices' - i.e. there would no 'NER approved tariff based on full avoided costs'. In 
addition, the transmission system would have to be organised to allow for the wheeling of 
electricity between different generators and their customers. 
The generators would be both IPPs from the previous restructuring stage and new entrants to 
the generation industry. The key question is whether Eskom Generation will remain intact or be 
broken up into a number of smaller independent companies. If it remains intact, it will be the 
dominant market player, able to act as a price leader and possibly even use its market power to 
exclude new entrants. Breaking Eskom Generation up into a number of separate companies 
will go a long towards creating a more competitive wholesale market. 8 The White Paper on 
Energy Policy notes that 'for future restructuring, government intends to separate the power 
stations [of Eskom] into a number of companies' (DME 1999: 44). 
The introduction of wholesale competition will require the development of an electricity market 
or power exchange. Exactly how this market will be organised and how it will set the price of 
electricity still has to be determined. It is also not clear who will be allowed to participate in the 
market. Certainly, all generators that meet stipulated technical standards are expected to be 
allowed to sell into the market. Figure 3 shows that distributors (REDs) and certain key 
8 See Barberton (2000) for a discussion of criteria to guide the decision whether to break Eskom Generation 
up into a number of smaller companies or to leave it intact. 
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industrial consumers are likely to be allowed to buy from the market. In addition to buying 
electricity from the power exchange, the REDs and key industrial customers may be able to 
contract directly with particular generators for electricity. 
The introduction of wholesale competition also requires open access to the transmission grid. 
To achieve this, it is expected that Eskom Transmission will continue to operate the national 
grid as a monopoly and all electricity transmitted on the grid will be subject to a regulated 
'wheeling charge'. This is confirmed by the White Paper on Energy Policy (DME 1999: 44): 
Government will legislate for transmission lines to provide for non-discriminatory 
access to uncommitted capacity,9 transparency of tariffs, and disclosure of cost and 
pricing information to the National Electricity Regulator. 
It is also likely that Eskom Transmission (or its successor company) will operate the power 
exchange, although there is no reason why it should not be set up as a completely separate 
business from the transmission business. 
The introduction of wholesale competition will not alter relationships between REDs and their 
customers. The former will still have exclusive franchises to supply particular areas, and the 
latter will not have any choice of supplier. 
2.4 Introduction of retail competition: 'retail competition' scenario 
Following international trends the next step after the establishment of wholesale competition 
would be the phased introduction of retail competition. First, end-users with a maximum 
demand exceeding, say, 11 MW may be allowed to choose their supplier, then end-users with a 
maximum demand greater than say 1MW, and so forth, until all end-users have choice of 
supply. The introduction of retail competition requires the separation of the 'wires' and 'energy' 
businesses both at the transmission and distribution levels of the ESI. In other words, there 
would need to be open access to energy retailers (which may be generators or power brokers) 
to both the transmission grid and all the distribution networks across the country, together with 
a framework of wheeling charges to ensure fair competition. This will require sophisticated 
energy management and billing systems to be put in place so as to match energy retailers to 
their customers and allocate the appropriate wheeling charge. 
As shown in Figure 4 the introduction of retail competition will enable end-users of electricity to 
choose from whom they purchase the 'energy' component of the service. It could be from their 
local RED, a neighbouring RED or an independent energy retailer such as a generator selling its 
own electricity or a power broker. The REDs will continue to have regional franchises over the 
'wires' components of the service, financed by wheeling charges. This is due to the natural 
monopoly characteristics of the 'wires' business. REDs may also continue to have an obligation 
to supply end-users within their franchise areas so as to ensure all customers are serviced. 
Obviously under full retail competition such a 'franchise obligation' would be lifted. However so 
long as there are large numbers of customers that do not consume sufficient electricity to cover 
the operating costs of supplying them such an obligation is likely to remain necessary. 
9 
Figure 4: The ESI with retail competition: the 'retail competition' scenario 
What is meant by 'uncommitted capacity' is not defined. See Barberton (2000: 33) where it is noted that 
'the very existence of such "committed capacity" militates against a competitive market'. 
ENERGY & DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE 
Exploring possible impacts of ESI restructuring on DSM 7 
Under retail competition there is likely to be a substantial amount of 'cherry picking', meaning 
that energy retailers will compete for the best (industrial and commercial) customers rather than 
the higher risk (domestic) customers. This would tend to place downward pressure on electricity 
tariffs available to the former customer groups and upward pressure on electricity tariffs offered 
to the Jess favoured customers, particularly low-income domestic customers. It would be 
incumbent on the NER to create a market framework for retail competition that ensures that all 
customer groups are treated equitably. 
3. Restructuring and DSM: Issues to consider 
A number of factors need to be considered when examining the likely impact ESI restructuring 
may have on future investment in DSM. The important point is that restructuring changes the 
incentives faced by the different stakeholders in the ESI. A utility operating in a monopolistic 
market structure may have an incentive to invest in DSM because it can capture the benefits of 
such investments due to the integrated nature of its business. Whereas after restructuring 
companies operating in competitive electricity markets may not may no longer face the same 
incentives because the benefits of DSM investments would be dispersed among all players. In 
some instances, changing the market structure could result in a reversal of incentives, so that 
instead of a generator seeking ways to get end-users to reduce their use of electricity, it seeks 
ways to achieve increased demand. This section explores a number of factors that could impact 
significantly on the incentives stakeholders face to undertake DSM both during the restructuring 
process itself and in the final restructured environment. 
3.1 Importance of the regulator 
ESI restructuring entails changing the market structure (and ownership) of the industry, which 
also implies altering the way in which the industry is regulated. In many instances, a central 
purpose of restructuring has been to reform the regulatory framework governing the ESI. The 
approach to regulation can have a significant impact on incentives for DSM since it is central to 
defining how electricity markets function and the conditions governing participation in such 
markets. For instance, the regulator may exercise direct control over the price of electricity and 
structure it in such a way as to include the cost of legitimate DSM expenditures. This will 
provide utilities with a strong incentive to undertake DSM because they can simply pass the cost 
on through the price. In contrast, the regulator may create a market where the price of 
electricity is determined on a competitive basis in which case the dominant incentive will be to 
minimise costs and increase sales so as to maximise profits. There would, thus, be little 
incentive to undertake DSM that tends to drive-up costs.10 
The regulator can seek to encourage DSM in different ways. For instance, it might simply 
instruct utilities to provide customers with energy audit services. Or it may seek to use market 
incentives to encourage appropriate behaviour. Such incentives may be built into the pricing 
mechanism of the market or into the licensing conditions for participation in the market. The 
important point is that the regulator can either encourage DSM or discourage it. 
3.2 Specifying an end-point to restructuring 
The choice of end-point to restructuring plays a major role in determining the incentives that 
stakeholders face with regards to investing in DSM. If the restructuring of the ESI is to end with 
the establishment of REDs then the incentives faced by, say, Eskom Generation to invest in 
DSM are likely to be very different than if restructuring were to proceed to the establishment of 
wholesale competition or even retail competition. The reason for this is that the extent of 
control that a generating utility has over the end-users of its electricity tends to diminish as 
restructuring progresses. As a result, it is not able to capture the 'capacity saving benefits' of any 
DSM investments it might make. In the more competitive scenarios these benefits would tend to 
be dissipated among other role-players in the generation industry. 
10 See Clark (1999) for a description of different countries' experiences with DSM. 
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Another important reason for specifying an end-point to restructuring is that it could facilitate 
the planning of ongoing investment in DSM. Restructuring usually results in a great deal of 
uncertainty among stakeholders. This uncertainty usually impacts negatively on investment in 
DSM, because stakeholders do not know whether they will retain control over the stream of 
benefits arising from an investment in DSM or whether such benefits will be lost to another role-
player due to the changing structure of the market. Therefore, in order to minimise their risks, 
they tend to defer DSM investments until the market has stabilised.11 One of the ways of 
reducing this uncertainty is for government to specify the end-point to restructuring early on in 
the process. Doing so signals to stakeholders how incentives will be structured in future which 
enables them to plan DSM investments accordingly_l2 This may reduce the 'wait-and-see' effect 
that restructuring has on such decisions. Instead, stakeholders would focus their efforts on 
preparing to compete successfully in the end-point environment rather than spending resources 
on positioning themselves in a climate of uncertainty. One of the difficulties with specifying an 
end-point, however, is that the realisation of the desired outcomes of restructuring is uncertain, 
and further restructuring may be necessary to address perverse outcomes. The experience in 
England and Wales is a case in point (Clark 1999). 
It is also possible that so long as the specified end-point falls short of full retail competition, it 
will be regarded as a holding position and that further restructuring is inevitable. However, it is 
difficult to envisage how long a particular 'holding position' may last. Recent experience with 
the process leading up to the imminent restructuring of the EDI suggests that periods between 
the successive stages of restructuring may be quite extensive - up to ten years. Indeed, so long 
as electricity markets are regarded as operating sub-optimally (and the understanding of 
optimal markets may differ over time), there is likely to be pressure for further restructuring. It 
could therefore be argued that, in the long-run, restructuring will only end with the 
establishment of effective competition in the wholesale and retail 'energy' markets, and possibly 
even in the provision of the 'wires' services in transmission and distribution. 
3.3 Different ownership options 
Ownership patterns within the ESI are often closely related to market structure. So for instance, 
a dominant player such as Eskom is invariably publicly owned. It is therefore difficult to 
separate out the impact that ownership patterns and the associated market structures have on 
DSM investment. At a general level, it could be argued that public utilities should be more 
inclined to undertake DSM of a social nature, while privately owned utilities, being more 
focused on profits, are more likely to invest in DSM that offers a real return to investment, 
rather than DSM with public good characteristics. 
The above argument is based on the assumption that the government is able to exercise greater 
influence over public utilities than private companies. This ignores the fact that the government 
can probably exercise greater control over utilities by way of regulation than it can by way of 
ownership, given that the range of regulatory incentives or sanctions is far greater than the 
sanctions or incentives associated with ownership. Regulatory incentives could include 
subsidies, tax benefits, fines, the withdrawal of operating licenses and imprisonment, whereas if 
the government owns a utility the only way it can influence behaviour is provide the funding to 
make the change, issue directives or replace the management. The extent of the government 
influence is even further reduced where public utilities are corporatised in preparation for 
privatisation. In such a situation there tends to be very limited regulatory/public oversight and 
no market pressures. Private companies are also generally far more conscious of the need to 
develop their brand or differentiate their products in order to compete successfully and are, 
therefore, often more ready to undertake social investments that have positive marketing spin-
11 
12 
Eskom seems to be acting very differently, in that it intends investing RSO million in DSM. As noted in 
section 4.3 the incentive for doing so seems to be to limit the growth in demand and therefore limit 
opportunities for competing generators to enter the market. 
Specifying the end-point to restructuring implies specifying the broad parameters of the regulatory regime 
as welL Obviously certain issues such as those relevant to DSM may be regulated independently. 
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offs. Such investments may include investment in DSM programmes with strong public good 
characteristics. 
International experience suggests that the pressures of the competitive market are forcing 
electricity retailers to increasingly seek ways to retain customers. One way is to offer 'value-
added electricity services' which may include a range of DSM, which involves differentiating 
their product from other retailers. Also, recent experience in the USA suggests that private 
companies are taking an increasing interest in energy efficiency DSM (education, information 
etc) because without it people will not invest in other types of DSM from which they can derive 
profits. Further, because they want to see such education and training done well they often 
want to do it themselves, which also limits their customers' interaction with other market players 
and therefore enhances customer retention. 
4. DSM in the different restructuring scenarios 
This section examines how the incentives to invest in DSM are likely to change between the 
different restructuring scenarios identified in section 2, taking into consideration the issues 
raised in the previous section. This section also draws on Clark and Barberton (1999) which 
examines the barriers currently inhibiting investment in South Africa. 
Since incentives are closely linked to the existence of opportunities and barriers for DSM in 
each scenario, attention is given to how these may change between scenarios. Attention is also 
given to the tools/policies available to the government or to stakeholders in the ESI either to 
take advantage of the opportunities or to overcome the barriers to implementing DSM. It is 
shown how these differ across the scenarios as well. 
The discussion focuses primarily on the incentives for DSM faced by the generation, 
transmission and distribution sectors of the ESI. The aim is to explore the rationale, strategies 
and so forth that stakeholders in these different sectors face. Given the range of potential issues, 
only the more important ones are discussed. For each scenario, a table has been prepared that 
summarises the rationale for DSM, the most likely DSM strategies, the opportunities and 
barriers to DSM, and the tools that stakeholders and policymakers are likely to use to promote 
DSM. 
It should be noted that the analysis in this section is based on a particular understanding of the 
relationships between different stakeholders in the ESI and how they are likely to benefit from 
DSM initiatives. For example, in the wholesale scenario it is assumed that all generators are 
completely separate from distributors and that any link between the two is purely contractual, 
i.e. REDs are not allowed to own their own generation capacity. There may well be differences 
of opinion regarding these relationships. While it may be possible to clarify some issues by 
gathering empirical data with reference to the status quo scenario, this is not possible in the 
case of the future scenarios. It is hoped that putting forward this analysis will encourage debate 
of the issues and that this will serve to bring greater clarity as to how restructuring is likely to 
impact on future investments in DSM. 
4.1 The 'status quo' scenario 
As shown in Figure 1 above, the ESI is currently dominated by Eskom. Until recently, Eskom 
was operated as an integrated utility, which meant that it would have been able to internalise 
most of the benefits accruing from any DSM investments it made. For instance, it could have 
undertaken DSM programmes aimed at increasing energy efficiency, which would have 
reduced the need for additional generation, transmission and even distribution capacity. The 
fact that Eskom did not invest much in DSM in the past ten (even fifteen) years can probably be 
attributed directly to the over-supply of generation capacity, the overall supply-driven approach 
of the utility, the scepticism about the efficacy of DSM and so forth, rather than uncertainty 
about who should invest in DSM or who would benefit from it (see Clark and Barberton (1999) 
for a more detailed discussion). 
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The recent move towards ring-fencing Eskom's generation, transmission and distribution 
operations has caused Eskom Distribution to explicitly ask: Who is most likely to benefit from 
DSM? And, therefore, who should pay for it? Until recently, Eskom Distribution implemented 
and paid for DSM programmes undertaken by Eskom. On the one hand, Eskom Distribution 
argues that Eskom Generation should pay for such programmes since it is the major beneficiary 
as DSM postpones the need to invest in additional generation capacity. On the other, Eskom 
Generation argues that it should not pay for DSM because (a) it is too far removed from 
customers, and (b) the Wholesale Electricity Tariff (WET) will provide sufficient incentive to 
encourage distributors (including Eskom Distribution) to undertake DSM where it is 
economically viable to do so (Clark and Barberton 1999: 39) 
Another important characteristic of the status quo is the relationship between Eskom 
Distribution and the municipal distributors. As noted above, all municipal distributors currently 
purchase electricity from Eskom Distribution (although the electricity itself is delivered to them 
by Eskom Transmission). The various tariffs are structured in such a way that they create a 
definite incentive for municipalities to invest in load-management DSM in order to minimise the 
cost of their electricity purchases, while maximising their revenues from on-selling electricity to 
end-usersP Clark and Barberton (1999: 12-15) note a range of strategies that municipalities 
use to shift load, including time-of-use tariffs, load limited tariffs, load factor correction, ripple 
control on domestic geysers and pumped storage. The incentive to invest in these strategies is 
overwhelmingly financial. Municipalities are able to intemalise much of the benefits because 
they have a monopoly within the areas under their jurisdiction.14 
Both Eskom Distribution and municipalities have a direct revenue interest in maximising 
electricity sales. They, therefore, generally have little financial incentive to undertiike energy-
efficiency DSM. In fact, both Eskom and municipalities have at different times undertaken 
programmes specifically to encourage greater electricity consumption. In some instances, this 
has entailed fuel substitution, which is arguably a more efficient use of resources, but more 
often the aim has simply been to increase sales and, hence, increase revenues. 15 In the case of 
Eskom, the need to increase sales has been driven by, among other things, the existence of 
excess generation capacity (and the need to pay the capital costs associated with building this 
capacity), by the need to pay for electrification, and the desire to become financially 
independent of government. Municipalities have also sought to increase sales, (a) so as to 
increase their surplus from electricity trading - which they use to subsidise the provision of 
other services, and (b) in order to pay for electrification. 
Since 1992 Eskom and municipalities have joined forces in the ElectroWise campaign16 'to 
positively influence consumption levels of newly electrified households' and thus contribute to 
the bottom line of both Eskom and the municipalities. This campaign has sought to address the 
problem that newly electrified households do not consume enough electricity to generate the 
revenue needed to cover the running costs, depreciation and interest associated with the 
distribution grids that service them.17 
The revenue incentive driving both Eskom and municipalities is a significant obstacle to the 
implementation of energy efficiency DSM. If such DSM were successful, electricity sales would 
decline and thus revenues would fall. This would reflect badly on Eskom Distribution's 
performance in terms of the key performance indicators (KPis) Eskom uses to evaluate its 






See Clark and Barberton (1999: 10-11) for further details. 
Durban Municipality, ho\#ever, argued that if it installed ripple control on geysers Eskom Generation 
would be the major beneficiary rather than the municipality (Clark and Barberton 1999: 14). 
The 'white goods' programmes for newly electrified households, the replacement of coal boilers in 
hospitals and prisons, and the installation of duel-fuel boilers in various different industries are examples 
(Clarke and Barberton 1999). 
For a more detailed description of this campaign see Clark and Barberton (1999: 31). 
In 1997 Eskom reported that "although the average monthly sales to prepayment customers have 
increased during 1997, this remains. significantly lower than the mount required to break even and 
subsequently generate positive returns (Eskom 1997: 43) 
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Consequently, in 1999 one of Eskom Distribution's top priorities was to increase electricity 
sales, which conflicts directly with its DSM responsibilities. As a result the prospects for DSM in 
Eskom are not good (Clark and Barberton 1999: 36-38). 
For municipalities a fall in the surplus they generate from their electricity trading activities would 
force them to charge more for other services or increase property taxes. Since neither option is 
likely to be politically acceptable, energy efficiency DSM is likely to continue to be neglected 
(Clark and Barberton 1999: 19). 
As it is in the current environment, many municipalities are holding back on investing in any 
form of DSM, given the uncertainty around the future ownership of REDs. They are not willing 
to invest in DSM or, for that matter, in electricity infrastructure generally because they fear 
losing out should they not be given a proportionate ownership stake in the REDs. In other 
words, they fear that any new investments in the electricity sector (whether it is on infrastructure 
or on improved servicing) may be lost to the REDs without them being adequately 
compensated either for the capital outlay or for the revenue stream that that outlay may have 
generated (Clark and Barberton 1999: 22). At a more general level, municipalities are less likely 
to invest in DSM measures, as the political demand for investment in other more 'visible' areas 
such as the provision of roads, sewerage systems and so forth is far stronger (Clark and 
Barberton 1999: 22). 
Table 1 summarises the points made above, as well as a number of other issues relevant to 
DSM in the 'status quo' scenario. 
DSM from different stakeholders' perspectives 
Generation 
Save building new generation 
capacity 
Optimise the use of existing 
generation capacity 
Public relations/ marketing 
Reduce system peak demand 
Reduce overall demand 
Encourage off-peak demand 
Foster efficient energy use 
Can intemalise all benefits of DSM 
spending due to integrated structure 
of Eskom 
Tariff system based on 'cost-
recovery' 
No price competition, so reducing 
costs is not an over-riding 
consideration 
Uncertainty in the EGI 
Low generation costs 
Excess generation capacity 
_Supply-side orientation 
No appreciation of DSM benefits 
DSM is perceived to be risky 
_ Limited personnel capacity 
Lack of contracting framework 
Customer resistance 
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Transmission 
Rationale for DSM 
Save on upgrading transmission 
networks 
DSM strategy 
Reduce peak/overall demand on 
specific sections of the transmission 
network 
Area and time specific interventions 
Foster efficient energy use 
Opportunities for DSM 
Distribution 
Save on upgrading distribution 
networks 
Public relations/marketing 
Reduce peak demand to save on 
energy bill with Eskom 
Reduce peak/overall demand on 
specific sections of the distribution 
network 
Area and time specific interventions 
Manage load profile 
Can intemalise all benefits of DSM Distribution monopoly allows benefits 
spending due to integrated structure of of DSM to be internalised 
Eskom 
Barriers to DSM 
Excess transmission capacity 
Supply-side orientation 
No appreciation of DSM benefits 
DSM is perceived to be risky 
Limited personnel capacity 
Tariffs are based on cost plus system, 
which means they can accommodate 
DSM expenditures 
No price competition, so reducing 
costs is not an over-riding 
consideration 
No choice of supplier 




Lack of finance 
Lack of contracting framework Limited personnel capacity 
Too many distributors to contract with National and local demand profiles 
differ 
Customer resistance 
No bulk time-of-use tariff 
Small size of distributors 
Customer resistance 
Exploring possible impacts of ESI restructuring on DSM 
Internal: 
Management directives 
Internal cost signals 
Allow cost recovery in bulk tariff 
External: 
Information and education 
Tariff structure 
Tools to realise DSM 
Internal: Internal: 
Management directives Management directives 
Internal cost signals Internal cost signals · 
Allow cost recovery in transmission Allow cost recovery in distribution 
tariff tariffs 
External: External: 
Information and education Information and education 
Tariff structure Facilitate and provide finance for DSM 
Tariff structure 
Contract with customers to implement Provide finance for DSM 
Provide finance for DSM 
12 
DSM Contract with customers to implement Contract with customers to implement 
Appliance supplier co-ordination and 
appliance labelling 
~M ~M 
Table 1: DSM in the 'status quo' scenario 
4.2 The 'REDs' scenario 
As noted in section 2.2, it would seem that the groundwork for the restructuring of the EDI is at 
last approaching completion, and that the actual restructuring is imminent. The consolidation of 
Eskom Distribution and the municipal distribution undertakings into REDs will go a long way to 
removing the current uncertainty in the EDI, i.e. the institutional structures of the EDI will be 
established and the rules of the 'new game' will become known. The newly established REDs 
are likely to seek to consolidate their financial positions by investing in a range of measures 
aimed at increasing revenues. One of the areas they are likely to focus on is DSM aimed at 
improving load management and encouraging strategic growth in demand. An analysis of the 
different barriers identified by Clark and Barberton (1999: 18-22) suggests that many of the 
barriers currently inhibiting DSM investment by municipalities will be removed with the 
establishment of REDs. This can be illustrated in three areas: 
• The uncertainty prior to the EDI restructuring process has led municipalities to under-invest 
in load-management DSM, with the result that there has been a build-up of investment 
opportunities. REDs are likely to be operating in a more certain environment and so will be 
able to take advantage of these opportunities. 
• The REDs are likely to be in a better position to evaluate the financial viability of DSM 
investments and, given REDs narrower focus on electricity, will face fewer competing 
priorities than was the case when distribution was a municipal responsibility. As a result 
REDs are more likely to invest in load management DSM than were municipalities. 
• The REDs will have access to the DSM expertise of Eskom Distribution and will therefore 
be better positioned to undertake DSM than were most municipalities. 
• The REDs are likely to be in a better position to raise the necessary finance to invest in 
load-management DSM than were municipalities. 
As regards the last point, REDs are likely to be financially far stronger than the sum of existing 
Eskom and municipal distributors, for at least two reasons. Firstly, they are likely to be able to 
realise significant scale economies in both their wires and energy retail operations, which will 
result in operational cost savings. Secondly, they will not be required to subsidise the provision 
of other municipal services directly.18 The improved financial position of the distribution 
industry as a whole is likely to free funds for investment in DSM measures that offer positive 
18 The technical advisor on the EDI restructuring is required to advise on all aspects of the proposed levy 
(DME 1999: 12). However, the municipal levy is unlikely to impact much on the financial position of 
REDs, as it is likely (if implemented) to take the form of an excise tax paid by end-users, with the REDs 
merely collecting it. 
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financial returns over the medium-to-long term.19 This is likely to exclude energy-efficiency 
DSM because of the impact it will have on electricity sales and therefore revenue. The fact that 
REDs will have regional franchises will further strengthen the incentive to invest in DSM other 
than energy efficiency, as they will be able to internalise much of the benefits arising from such 
investments. The REDs would benefit from better management of their demand profile vis-a-vis 
Eskom Generation or through managing the timing of expenditure on upgrading distribution 
networks.20 
The restructuring of the EDI is likely to be accompanied by the introduction of both a cost-
reflective wholesale time-of-use tariff (the Wholesale Electricity Tariff (WET)) between Eskom 
Generation (which operates an internal national power pool) and REDs.21 The WET tariff is 
likely to provide added impetus for REDs to invest in interruptibility, load-shifting and strategic-
growth DSM because of the price incentives it puts in place. Other things being equal, there 
does not appear to be any reason why the WET tariff should encourage REDs to invest in 
energy-efficiency DSM, which would tend to impact negatively on their revenues. However, if 
the REDs give their customers the option of moving to time-of-use tariffs (i.e. the WET tariff is 
passed on to end-users) they may begin to demand energy efficiency services. REDs may 
choose to supply such services either as part of a marketing package aimed at branding their 
'product'/'service' or as a separate enterprise such as an ESCO. 
The creation of the REDs will further break up the vertically integrated nature of Eskom. 
Distribution will be operated by completely separate entities from transmission and generation. 
However, this does not mean that both transmission and generation cannot benefit from DSM 
measures implemented by REDs. By its very definition, DSM would have to be implemented by 
REDs since they interface with customers. But benefits such as reducing the need to upgrade 
transmission networks or postpone the need to build generating capacity would still accrue to 
transmission and generation respectively. This may cause the REDs to seek ways to explicitly 
pass on the costs of DSM to both the transmission and generation utilities. 
The introduction of a single purchaser (independent of Eskom Generation) is likely to cause a 
measure of uncertainty in generation, as it will be seen as the first step towards the introduction 
of wholesale competition. Even though Eskom Generation will probably remain intact for some 
time, there are likely be pressures from within the utility to begin positioning its constituent parts 
for increased competition. Indeed, generators are being clustered together into operational units 
in preparation for the creation of a number of separate companies in line with the policy set out 
in the White Paper on Energy Policy (1999: 44). Each of these units would compete against the 
others. Consequently, individual unit managers would be hesitant to make any DSM 
investments given that the benefits (such as the reduced need for new generation capacity) 
would take on 'common good' characteristics and not accrue to the individual unit. 
International experience also suggests that when utilities are preparing for privatisation they cut 
back on what they perceive to be 'non-essential' expenditures, which includes expenditure on 
DSM, particularly energy-efficiency DSM (Clark, 1999). 
Another consequence of the creation of REDS is that it significantly reduces the number of 
distributors that Eskom Generation and Eskom Transmission would have to contract in order to 
get implemented those DSM measures that they want. Say Eskom Transmission wishes to 
initiate investment in a range of DSM measures aimed at reducing the growth in demand on a 
particular transmission line with a view to postponing the date of investing in upgrading the 




Currently most municipalities are so short of funds that they simply cannot consider the initial cost of DSM 
even though it offers positive returns over the medium-to-long term. Many do not even have the funds to 
cover operating expenses. 
When end-users' demand on a given network exceeds its capacity the distributor has to upgrade the 
network. The distributor may be able to postpone making this potentially large investment by investing a 
far lessor amount in both load management and energy-efficiency DSM. 
It has not been clarified whether a 'single purchaser' independent of Eskom Generation will be established 
to buy electricity from generators and on-sell it to distributors. The White Paper on Energy policy commits 
the government to initiating a comprehensive study on future market structures (DME 1999: 43). 
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municipal distributors to make the required investment. In the REDs scenario it would in all 
likelihood only have to contract with one RED to achieve the same outcome. This is likely to 
reduce the transaction costs of such contracts very significantly. The fact that there will be far 
fewer distributors may facilitate the conclusion of contracts aimed at getting the REDs to 
implement specific DSM programmes on behalf of, and paid for by, Eskom Transmission or 
Eskom Generation. However, it is doubtful whether Eskom Transmission and Eskom 
Generation would come forward with proposed investments of this nature, given the other 
barriers noted above. 
An unknown variable in this discussion is what the regulator may require of ESI role-players 
with regards to DSM investment in the REDs scenario. The regulator may adopt a hands-off . 
approach and allow industry players to respond to initiatives such as the WET tariff. The result 
of such a policy is likely to be that: (a) REDs will make some investments in interruptibility, load 
shifting and strategic growth DSM; (b) Transmission will only invest in DSM where there is a 
direct benefit such postponing the upgrading of a transmission line; and (c) generators will not 
invest in DSM at all. On the other hand the regulator may seek to provide some 'regulatory 
encouragement' to ESI role-players to ensure that the public good element of DSM investments 
(especially energy efficiency) is not forgone. This may be done in a variety of ways and largely 
depends on the regulatory approach the regulator adopts. The regulator may include specific 
conditions relating to DSM in the licenses it issues. It may structure prices so as to allow utilities 
to recover DSM expenditures, or only their lost revenue. Another option would be to place a 
minimal levy on each unit of electricity sold to pay for DSM, particularly energy efficiency DSM. 
Table 2 summarises the points made above, as well as a number of other issues relevant to 
DSM in the REDs scenario. 
DSM from different stakeholders' perspectives 
Generation I Transmission I Distribution 
Rationale for DSM 
Save building new generation capacity Save on upgrading transmission Save on upgrading distribution networks 
Public relations/marketing Optimise the use of existing 
generation capacity 
Public relations/marketing . 
Reduce system peak demand 
Reduce overall demand 
Encourage off-peak demand 
Foster efficient energy use 
Can intemalise most benefits of DSM 
spending due dominant position of 
Eskom Generation 
Tariff system based on 'cost-recovery' 
No price competition 
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networks 
OSM strategy 
Reduce peak demand to save on 
energy bill 
Greater emphasis on cost management 
Reduce peak/overall demand on Reduce peak/overall demand on 
specific sections of the transmission specific sections of the distribution 
network network 
Area and time specific interventions Area and time specific interventions 
Foster efficient energy use Manage load profile 
Opportunities for DSM 
Fewer distributors to contract with 
Can intemalise most benefits of 
DSM spending due to monopoly 
position 
Certainty in structure of EDI 
Focus on electricity business 
Distribution monopoly allows most 
benefits of DSM to be internalised 
No price competition between 
distributors 
No choice of supplier 
Tariffs based on cost plus system 
Exploring possible impacts of ESI restructuring on DSM 
Effect of ring-fencing 
· Greater uncertainty in the EGI 
Low generation costs 
Excess generation capacity 
Supply-side orientation 
No appreciation of DSM benefits 
DSM is perceived to be risky 




Internal cost signals 
Allow cost recovery in bulk tariff 
External: 
Introduction of time-of-use tariffs 
Greater scope for contracting with 
customers to implement DSM 
Information and education 
Barriers to DSM 
Excess transmission capacity 
Supply-side orientation 
No appreciation of DSM benefits 
DSM is perceived to be risky 
Limited personnel capacity 
Customer resistance 
Tools to realise DSM 
Internal: 
Management directives 
Internal cost signals 
Allow cost recovery in transmission 
tariff 
External: 
Introduction of 'cost-reflective' tariffs 
Greater scope for contracting with 
customers to implement DSM 
Information and education Facilitate and provide finance for DSM 
Provide finance for DSM Appliance supplier co-ordination and 
appliance labelling 
Threat of retail competition 








Internal cost signals 
Allow cost recovery in distribution 
tariffs 
External: 
Information and education 
Tariff structure 
Installation of prepayment meters 
Provide finance for DSM 
Contract with customers to implement 
DSM 
Table 2: DSM after distribution restructuring: the REDs scenario 
4.3 The 'wholesale competition' scenario 
Importantly, introducing wholesale competition is unlikely to impact significantly on the 
incentives for DSM faced by the transmission and distribution sectors of the ESI. It is, however, 
likely to have a major impact on the incentives faced by utilities in the generation industry. To 
the extent that generation initiates DSM undertaken by distributors, this change in incentives 
would impact on the amount of DSM generation 'commission' distribution to undertake on its 
behalf. 
The extent to which the introduction of wholesale competition is likely to impact on DSM 
investments will partly depend on the competitiveness of the wholesale market. As noted in 
section 2.3, this will in tum depend on whether Eskom Generation is divided up into a number 
of smaller independent companies, or left intact. If it is allowed to remain intact, it will be the 
dominant market player, able to act as a price leader and possibly even use its market power to 
limit opportunities for new entrants. One of the ways it may seek to discourage new entrants to 
the generation industry could be to invest heavily in DSM aimed at increasing energy efficiency. 
This would reduce the demand for additional generation capacity and thus control the potential 
'space' in the market for admitting new entrants. Exactly how effective such a strategy would be 
depends on how much potential there is for 'capacity saving DSM' and the rate of growth in 
demand for electricity. 
Such a course of action may be attractive to Eskom if, as is expected, the government decides 
that in future additional generation capacity must be built by independent power producers. In 
effect, Eskom Generation would be competing in the new generation market by investing in 
reducing the demand for additional capacity. Theoretically, Eskom Generation would continue 
to make such investments so long as the cost of increasing energy efficiency is less than the 
perceived cost to itself of admitting a competitor into the market. From an integrated resource 
planning perspective this may not result in an efficient (i.e. economically optimal) use of 
resources (it may result in over-investment in energy efficiency!). However, it would be efficient 
while the cost of such DSM measures is less than the cost of building additional generation 
capacity. Recently Eskom approved investing RSO million in DSM, which seems to lend some 
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credence to the above suggestion. Even though this is being done prior to the introduction of 
wholesale competition the motivation might be the same. 
Breaking up Eskom Generation into a number of separate companies will create a more 
competitive wholesale market, which is likely to cause players in the generation industry to 
place greater emphasis on cost management in order to be price-competitive. One of the areas 
likely to be cut is DSM expenditure, given the prevailing supply-side orientation of utility 
managers and the perception that most DSM, especially energy efficiency, does not offer certain 
returns. The pressure on DSM expenditures is likely to be greatest where utilities are reliant on 
selling to a power pool where price is the discriminating factor. 
The perception that energy-efficiency DSM does not offer utilities certain returns is likely to be 
strengthened by the move towards wholesale competition. This can be illustrated as follows: if a 
generation company contracts a distributor to implement a load-shifting or interruptibility DSM 
programme aimed at reducing peak demand, the benefits of such an investment would tend to 
accrue to all players in the generation sector and not only to the generator paying for the 
investment. This is because the benefit of a lower peak demand would have 'commons good' 
characteristics such as non-exclusivity. In other words, the generator that made the initial 
investment would not be able to capture or internalise all the benefits of the investment. Some 
of the benefits would accrue to other generators as well. As a result, investments in DSM would 
tend to fall victim to the so-called 'free rider' problem: if some generators invest in DSM all 
others will benefit. Therefore the rational generator will not invest, in the hope of being able to 
free-ride on others' investments. However, if all generators act rationally, none of them will 
invest in DSM, and therefore no benefit will be realised. 
One of the ways of getting around the free-rider problem would be for generators to conclude 
long-term supply contracts with distributors or end-users that are structured in such a way as to 
enable them to capture the benefits of any DSM investments they might make. For example, 
the supply contracts that a generator has with large industrial end-users could include 
interruptible load agreements which allows interruptions only at the discretion of that generator. 
This would allow the generator to operate closer to its load margin, as it would have the 
interruptible capacity in reserve. Generally speaking, the pressure on all kinds of DSM is likely 
to be less pronounced where utilities compete for long-term contracts to supply key industrial 
customers or REDs. In such instances they may offer certain DSM services (or counter 
investments)22 in order to differentiate their particular energy service. Indeed, a situation may 
even arise where REDs and large industrial customers demand certain levels of DSM 
investment by generators as part of such long-term supply contracts. The rationale would be 
that it is in their interest to stabilise their demand for electricity to a level that the generator is 
able to supply, so that they do not have to purchase additional power from the more expensive 
electricity pool. From the utility's perspective, it would wish to service all their customers' 
energy needs so as to avoid losing them to competitors. 
Generators selling to a power pool would have no incentive to encourage any form of DSM. If 
the generating capacity supplying the pool is fixed, as the demand for electricity from the pool 
increases so the price will rise. Therefore generators intent on maximising profits will want 
demand to exceed supply consistently. Interruptibility, load-shifting and energy efficiency DSM 
would tend to moderate demand which would have a negative impact on prices during peaks. 
However, undertakings such as Eskom Enterprises' Virtual Power Station could play a crucial 
role in a power pool by offering to sell 'negawatts' during peaks. Such 'negawatts' would be 
'generated' by load-shifting and interruptibility DSM managed by the Virtual Power Station. 
Theoretically it is even possible for a company to sell 'negawatts' to the power pool generated 
from the implementation of energy-efficiency DSM. However, practically it is difficult to verify 
and measure the extent of savings resulting from a given energy-efficiency programme. The 
22 For instance, in order to get a long-term supply contract with a REO, the generator may offer to assist 
finance a ripple-control system on domestic geysers. This would be to the benefit of the RED as it would 
smooth its demand profde and it would benefit the generator by reducing the amount of peaking capacity 
it needs in reserve in order to supply the REO. It would also add another dimension to the simple 
electricity supply contract which would make it more secure. 
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price the pool would be willing to pay for such negawatts would also be very low, given that 
they would be comparable to base-load power rather than peaking power.· 
Again, an unknown variable in this discussion is what the regulator may require of ESI role-
players with regards to DSM investment in this scenario. As noted above, if the regulator adopts 
a hands-off approach, transmission and distribution will only invest in DSM when it makes 
financial sense to do so, while generation is unlikely to invest in any DSM at all. If, however, the 
regulator were to seek to provide some 'regulatory encouragement' the different approaches 
noted previously would still apply. 
Table 3 summarises the points made above, as well as a number of other issues relevant to 
DSM in the 'wholesale competition' scenario; 
DSM from different stakeholders' perspectives 
Generation 
Emphasis on cost management 
and price/ service competition 
Public relations/marketing 
Provide a competitive customer 
service 
Can contract directly with 
REDs/customers to realise DSM 
savings 
The competitive market structure 
DSM becomes a 'commons good' 
(free rider problem) 
Low generation costs 
Excess generation capacity 
Supply-side orientation 
No appreciation of DSM benefits 
DSM is perceived to be risky 
Limited personnel capacity 
Customer resistance 
Transmission 
Rationale for DSM 
Save on upgrading transmission 
networks 
Emphasis on cost management 
DSM strategy 
Reduce peak/overall demand on 
specific sections of the transmission 
network 
Area and time specific interventions 
Foster efficient energy use 
Opportunities for DSM 
Fewer distributors to contract with 
Can intemalise most benefits of DSM 
spending due to monopoly position 
Barriers to DSM 
Excess transmission capacity 
Supply-side orientation 
No appreciation of DSM benefits 
DSM is perceived to be risky 
Limited personnel capacity 
Customer resistance 
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Distribution 
Save on upgrading distribution networks 
Public relations/marketing 
Reduce peak demand to save on energy bill 
with Eskom 
Emphasis on cost management 
Reduce peak/overall demand on specific 
sections of the distribution network 
Area and time specific interventions 
Manage load profile 
Certainty in structure of EDI 
Focus on electricity business 
Distribution monopoly allows benefits of 
DSM to be internalised 
No price competition between distributors 
No choice of supplier 
Tariffs are based on cost plus system 
Threat of retail competition 
Revenue interest 
Supply-side orientation 
National and local demand profiles differ 
Customer resistance 
Exploring possible impacts of ESI restructuring on DSM 
Internal: 
. Management directives 
External: 
Tools to realise DSM 
Internal: 
Management directives 
Internal cost signals 
Internal: 
Management directives 
Internal cost signals 
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Time-of-use tariffs Allow cost recovery in transmission tariff Allow cost recovery in distribution tariffs 
Use long term contracts with 




Greater scope for contracting with 
customers to implement DSM 
Information and education 
Provide finance for DSM 
Information and education 
Tariff structure 
Installation of prepayment meters 
Provide finance for DSM 
Contract with customers to implement DSM 
Table 3: DSM after generation restructuring: the 'wholesale competition' scenario 
4.4 The 'retail competition' scenario 
While the introduction of wholesale competition is likely to impact on how generators regard 
DSM, the move towards retail competition is likely to bring about significant changes in 
incentives for DSM at the distribution and retail end of the ESI. The introduction of 
competition for generation services at the retail level is likely to leave the incentives for DSM for 
both generation and transmission largely unchanged relative to the previous scenario. 
As noted in section 2.4, the introduction of retail competition requires the separation of the 
'wires' and 'energy' businesses at the distribution level of the ESI. The 'wires' businesses would 
continue to function as regional franchises connecting all end-users within their areas to the 
distribution network, because of the natural monopoly characteristics of the 'wires business'. 
The 'energy' or retail businesses would then compete to sell electricity to the end-users and pay 
the wires businesses a wheeling charge for taking the electricity to their customers. This 
separation of the 'wires' and 'energy' businesses is likely to cause significant changes in the 
structure of incentives for DSM at the distribution level. 
In each of the previous scenarios, REDs provided integrated wires and energy services to 
customers. Consequently, on the one hand they had a revenue interest in increasing electricity 
sales and, on the other hand, an incentive to encourage energy efficiency in order to save on 
investments in upgrading their distribution networks. Given the perception that returns to DSM 
investments (other than ripple control) are uncertain, it is expected that REDs will seek to 
maximise their revenue from electricity sales, and only in exceptional circumstances invest in 
other types of DSM with a view to postponing network upgrades. However, separating the 
wires and energy businesses is likely to clarify the respective businesses' interests with regard to 
the different types of DSM. It is expected that the 'wires' businesses will become far more 
proactive in the use of all the different types of DSM to maximise the return on their existing 
network investments. In other words, such 'wires' businesses are more likely to see investment 
in DSM (load management and energy efficiency) as a means of postponing the need to invest 
in upgrading a particular distribution network. They are also likely to be in a better position to 
evaluate the costs and benefits of such options given that their narrower focus on the 'wires' 
business. In some instances, the 'wires businesses' may be able to contract directly with end-
users to implement particular DSM measures, such as ripple control devices on geysers to 
reduce peak demand on a particular distribution network. In other instances, the 'wires' 
businesses may have to contract 'energy' businesses operating in their areas to implement, say, 
an interruptibility DSM programme. This may entail agreeing to compensate the energy 
business for some proportion of lost revenue resulting from the implementation of the DSM 
programme. A third option would be for the 'wires' business to contract an independent energy 
service company (ESCO) or perhaps even an NGO to supply a giv.en DSM service, in all 
likelihood energy efficiency DSM. This would eliminate the conflict of interests and the need to 
compensate for lost revenues as a result of contracting an 'energy' business. 
At a superficial level, it may seem that the new 'energy' businesses will have little incentive to 
undertake any form of DSM that reduces energy sales, most notably energy efficiency. This is 
based on the assumption that their interests are best served by maximising electricity sales. 
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Managers of 'energy' retailers that hold this view will see little reason to invest in DSM. A focus 
on price competition is also likely to reduce the incentive for DSM investments, as there would 
be reduced scope for individual retailers to recover the costs of DSM expenditures through their 
prices as this would tend to undermine their competitiveness. 
It is possible that, as the retail market matures, certain 'energy' retailers will seek to differentiate 
their product by offering their customers 'more than just electricity'. This could take the form of 
an integrated package of energy services, including advice on load management and energy 
efficiency, as well as complementary services such energy audits. In other words, the energy 
retailers would begin to seek to offer competitive energy services, rather than competing only 
with regard to the price of electricity. Offering such services may also be crucial to getting 
customers to agree to longer-term contracts, which would be key to enabling energy businesses 
efforts to stabilise their revenue base. 
Retail competition also means that end-users will be able to choose their supplier. For the vast 
majority of end-users the price of electricity is likely to be the most important variable in 
determining from whom they choose to purchase their electricity. However, as end-users 
become more environmentally sensitive, some may begin to seek an integrated energy service 
that includes DSM services. This would represent the demand side for product differentiation in 
the energy retail market. 
Table 4 summarises the points made above, as well as a number of other issues relevant to 
DSM in the retail scenario. 
DSM from different stakeholders perspectives 
Generation 
Emphasis on cost management 
and price/ service competition 
Provide a competitive customer 
service 
Can contract directly with 
REDs/customers to realise DSM 
savings 
The competitive market structure 
DSM becomes a 'commons good' 
(free rider problem) 
Low generation costs 
Excess generation capacity 
Supply-side orientation 
No appreciation of DSM benefits 
DSM is perceived to be risky 
Limited personnel capacity 
Customer resistance 
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Transmission 
Rationale for DSM 
Save on upgrading transmission 
networks 
Emphasis on cost management 
DSM strategy 
Distribution 
Emphasis on cost management and 
price/ service competition 
Reduce peak/overall demand on Provide a competitive customer 
specific sections of the transmission service 
network 
Area and time specific interventions 
Foster efficient energy use 
Opportunities for DSM 
Fewer distributors to contract with 
Excess transmission capacity 
Supply-side orientation 
No appreciation of DSM benefits 
DSM is perceived to be risky 
Limited personnel capacity 
Customer resistance 
Focus on electricity business 
Customers can change supplier 
Uncertainty due to separation of 
'wires' and 'energy' businesses 
Revenue interest 
Supply-side orientation 
National and local demand profiles 
differ 
Customer resistance 
Exploring possible impacts of ESI restructuring on DSM 
Internal: 
. Management directives 
External: 
Tools to realise DSM 
Internal: 
Management directives 






Greater scope for contracting with 
customers to implement DSM 
Allow cost recovery in transmission 
tariff 




Greater scope for contracting with 
customers to implement DSM 
Information and education 
Provide finance for DSM 
Table 4: DSM in the retail competition scenario 
5. Restructuring and DSM: an overview of trends 
The preceding sections suggest that ESI restructuring may continue through to the introduction 
of full retail competition. However, the process of restructuring is unlikely to be continuous. As 
noted in section 3.2, the time periods between the successive phases of restructuring may be 
quite extensive - up to ten years. This is ample time for stakeholders to adapt to each new 
environment and take advantage of the opportunities they afford. It may therefore be 
somewhat misleading to frame this discussion in terms of 'trends', since, while the process of 
change may be rapid at the time of restructuring from one scenario to the next, things might be 
quite stable in the interim periods. With this caveat in mind, this section looks at a number of 
key changes associated with restructuring across the different scenarios discussed in section 4 
and how these are likely to impact on incentives to investment in DSM. 
5.1 Movement away from an integrated industry structure 
Each of the scenarios identified in section 4 represent a step away from an integrated industry 
structure. In the status quo scenario, Eskom is in the process of ring-fencing and clustering its 
various operations. This, to a large degree, serves to define each division's interests in DSM 
more clearly. However, while the divisions may operate independently, they still report to the 
same executive management and board which are able to integrate their different interests to 
serve the interests of the whole of Eskom. Obviously, as the process of ring-fencing progresses, 
each division will define its own interests more clearly. In the REDs scenario, the distribution 
sector is consolidated into a number of independent companies, and an arms-length 
relationship is introduced between generation and transmission by means of the single 
purchaser mechanism. In the wholesale competition scenario, the 'energy' and 'wires' 
businesses are separated from each other at the transmission level. To achieve this a power 
pool and independent system operator need to be established, wheeling charges for 
transmission introduced, and generators given the right to contract directly with large end-users 
and distributors. Finally, in the retail competition scenario the 'energy' and 'wires' businesses 
are separated out from each other at the distribution level. 
The process of moving away from an integrated industry structure is likely to impact on DSM 
investment in at least three ways. Firstly, breaking the ESI up into its constituent parts tends to 
clarify different stakeholders' interests in DSM. As noted above, 'wires' and 'energy' businesses 
face very different incentives when it comes to evaluating investments in different types of DSM. 
Where these businesses are undertaken by a single undertaking, such as a RED, there is likely 
to be a lack of clarity as to what DSM measures are in its interests. For instance it may be 
rational from a 'wires' business point of view to invest in energy efficiency DSM in order to 
postpone the need for a network upgrade. This would, however, impact negatively on the 
revenues of the 'energy' business side of the RED. The RED would thus have to evaluate what 
makes overall financial sense. The process of balancing revenue impacts against other potential 
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benefits is likely to perpetuate the perception that energy efficiency DSM does not offer a RED 
any clear-cut benefits. 
Secondly, and in contrast to the above point, the move away from an integrated industry 
structure is likely to make it more difficult for the utility or company making the DSM 
investment to capture and internalise all the benefits. For instance, DSM investments at the 
distribution level may hold benefits for the distributor, as well as transmission and generation. A 
vertically integrated electricity utility would be able to capture and internalise all these benefits. 
In contrast, in a non-integrated industry these benefits would accrue to a number of companies 
other than the company that made the original DSM investment. As a consequence, certain 
DSM investments may offer better returns in an integrated industry structure than in a non-
integrated environment. This point can also be illustrated with reference to the generation 
sector. If there is a single generating utility it is able to make the trade-off between the cost of 
building new generating capacity and the cost of capacity-saving DSM measures (such as load-
shifting, interruptibility and energy efficiency). Should demand increase it may decide to invest 
in DSM instead of build new capacity. However, where there are a number of generating 
companies the benefits from DSM investments aimed at reducing the demand for new 
generating capacity would have 'commons goods' characteristics. No single company would be 
able to capture the benefit. Some companies may even see such investments as a lost 
opportunity to expand their own capacity and therefore their share of the generation market. 
Thirdly, the movement away from an integrated industry structure tends to result in a clear 
distinction being drawn between DSM that is financially viable and DSM that is predominantly 
a public good. This is because the various companies that emerge from the restructuring 
process are likely to be far more focused on realising acceptable returns on investments than a 
large, integrated, monopolistic utility. Whereas the latter might invest in a wide range of DSM 
measures (as part of its contribution to the public good), the former are likely to be far more 
discriminating and only invest in those DSM measures that offer the utility positive financial 
benefits. Consequently, utility investment in DSM of a public good nature is likely to decline as 
restructuring progresses, unless the government (probably acting through the regulator) takes 
measures to counteract the trend (see section 5.4). 
5.2 Separation of wires and energy businesses 
As noted in section 4, the 'wires' and 'energy' businesses are separated out from each other in 
two stages: first in the wholesale competition scenario the bulk energy business is separated 
from the transmission 'wires' business. Second, with the introduction of retail competition the 
distribution 'wires' businesses would be separated from energy retail businesses. In addition to 
the points noted in the preceding section, the establishment of separate 'wires' and 'energy' 
businesses is likely to impact on DSM in the following ways: firstly, it removes from the 
equation the revenue incentive associated with electricity sales when a 'wires' business comes 
to evaluating whether to implement a DSM programme in order to avoid a network upgrade 
(see section 4.4). 
Secondly, it enables the 'wires' businesses to focus exclusively on maximising returns on their 
investments. This is likely to entail moving away from the supply-side approach that has tended 
to dominate the provision of transmission and distribution infrastructure to date. Instead, 'wires' 
businesses are likely to focus on finding the most economical way of ensuring their customers 
have access to the electricity services they require. This may involve investing in DSM measures 
in order to reduce peak demand growth and thus extend the useful life of existing infrastructure, 
as opposed to simply allowing the growth in demand to dictate when. a particular line had to be 
upgraded. . 
Thirdly, it creates an environment in which energy services can develop beyond offering 
customers more than just electricity. As noted in sections 4.3 and 4.4, companies in the 'energy' 
business (both generators and energy retailers) will begin to seek ways to differentiate their 
product, and this may lead them to offer an integrated package of energy services that could 
include certain DSM measures or 'counter investments'. Some of these measure may amount 
to little more than marketing aimed at attracting and retaining customers, but the possibility 
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exists that they could be developed further into separate revenue generating services that the 
'energy' business can offer to clients. 
5.3 Impact of competitive electricity pricing on DSM 
A key objective of nearly all restructuring processes is to move the ESI towards greater reliance 
on markets for determining the price of electricity. In the above scenarios, this is reflected first 
by the introduction of a single purchaser, then wholesale competition and, finally, retail 
competition. Looking at the impact that this move towards competitive electricity pricing is 
likely to have on DSM, the following points come to the fore: 
• Firstly, 'energy' businesses will tend to focus on managing-down costs in order to be able to 
price their electricity competitively. This will inevitably mean cutting back on non-essential 
expenditures. Many of these 'energy' businesses may regard DSM as a non-essential 
expenditure and therefore eliminate it completely, or only maintain a token amount for 
marketing purposes. 
• Secondly, in a non-competitive market structure, utilities are often allowed to use their tariffs 
or other chargers to recover reasonable costs incurred in the course making DSM and other 
'public good' investments. However, in a competitive market the process for determining the 
price of electricity often does not lend itself to recovering such expenditures. Companies are 
therefore less likely to make such expenditures given that they will not be able to recover 
them in the normal course of their activities. This will tend to discourage expenditure on 
DSM. One way of overcoming this obstacle would be for the government to institute a levy 
on all electricity sales to finance DSM programmes with a strong public good content. This 
would be a system-wide distribution charge (per kWh usage or per account) levied on all 
customers. Alternatively, the regulator may seek to structure tariffs so as to allow companies 
to recover costs incurred as a result of DSM investments. However, mechanisms to recover 
costs are unlikely to be effective where energy businesses are very price-competitive. This is 
likely to be especially true with retail competition. A retailer would not want to recover 
expenditures and lost revenues from DSM investments because it would increase its price 
above competitors' prices. Consequently the retailer would simply prefer not to invest in 
DSM. 
• Thirdly, it is often argued that determining electricity prices in a competitive market will 
place downward pressure on electricity prices (DME 1998: 43). Should this happen it will 
tend to encourage end-users to consume more electricity, and thus reduce the financial 
incentive to invest in energy efficiency. This may not be a desirable outcome when viewed 
from an integrated resource management perspective. 
However, when competition in the wholesale and retail energy markets is examined more 
holistically, competitive electricity prices are likely to be an important, but by no means an over-
riding factor. As the market for energy matures and customers become more discerning, 
companies are likely to seek ways to differentiate their services in order to attract and retain 
customers. A move in this direction will offer exciting opportunities for the development of 
DSM, including the development of integrated energy service packages, the conclusion of long-
term contracts that allow energy companies to internalise the benefits of DSM investments and 
the development of energy services as a separate revenue earning activity. This latter 
development could even result in the establishment of energy service companies (ESCOs) that 
focus on DSM measures that can generate positive returns on investments. 
It should be also be noted that while the 'energy' side of the electricity industry is likely to be 
exposed to competitive pricing, wheeling charges on the 'wires' side of the electricity industry 
will continue to be regulated. This means that many of the pressures noted above will not apply 
to these charges. There does not appear to be any reason why 'wires' businesses in the 
transmission and distribution industries should not be allowed to recover reasonably incurred 
DSM expenditures through wheeling charges. 
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5.4 Energy efficiency DSM becomes a 'commons good• 
In the discussion of the wholesale scenario in section 4.3, it was noted that the emergence of a 
·number of generating companies resulted in the benefits from DSM investments taking on 
'commons good' characteristics. As certain intenuptibility, load-shifting and energy efficiency 
DSM measures take on the 'commons good' characteristic of non-exclusivity, investment in 
these measures is likely to fall. The reason for this is that, when a company assesses the returns 
on such a DSM investment, it will realise that it is unlikely to capture sufficient of the benefit to 
make the investment worthwhile, since the benefit will be spread across other players in the 
industry. With this information, the rational company is likely to adopt a free-rider position. In 
other words, rather than making the investment itself, it will hope to derive benefit from others 
making such investments. If all companies act rationally, the consequence will be that little or 
no investment will actually take place. 
There are a number of ways in which industry players can seek to overcome this 'commons 
good' problem. It has been noted above that generators may seek to 'capture' the benefits by 
concluding long-term contracts with the end-users in which they would be making the DSM 
investment. This could be regarded as a private market solution to the problem. Another 
approach could be to get all the industry players together and to conclude an industry-wide 
agreement, binding all parties to making certain minimum investments in particular DSM 
measures. This would significantly reduce the information gap associated with the free-rider 
problem, but it would not completely eliminate the risk of certain companies seeking to free-
ride the agreement. It would therefore require some form of monitoring system to be put in 
place to ensure that all companies keep to the terms of the agreement. A third approach would 
be for the government to address the market failure in some way. For instance, it could set up 
an autonomous agency to oversee the implementation of DSM. This agency could be funded 
either from the fiscus or by a levy on energy sales. Another option would be to make it a 
condition of generators' and energy retailers' trading licenses that they undertake certain DSM 
investments. This would still require some form of monitoring to ensure compliance. (See Clark 
and Mavhungu (2000) for more details on these measures.) 
5.5 Investment in DSM with public goods characteristics 
As the ESI is restructured, the various stakeholders that emerge from the process will be 
increasingly focused on managing costs and generating a market-related return on investments. 
Consequently, if left to themselves, they are only likely to choose to invest in DSM programmes 
that offer clear financial returns. On the one hand, this can be very beneficial for the 
implementation of strategic growth, load-shifting and intenuptibility DSM, and to a lessor extent 
energy efficiency DSM. Instead of being considered only as a green issue or a public relations 
investment, the option to invest in DSM will increasingly be considered in the same light as 
other investment options. Consequently, where DSM offers good returns, companies will have 
to seriously consider making such investments, simply to be competitive. It could even lead to a 
situation where companies begin to offer integrated energy services that include DSM measures 
as a means of generating income. Ultimately it could lead to the establishment of ESCOs that 
focus on providing DSM related services. 
On the other hand, companies with an over-riding commercial focus are less likely to invest in 
DSM that has strong public good characteristics, most notably energy efficiency. Indeed, as 
restructuring progresses, less and less is likely to be invested in encouraging end-users to 
become more energy-efficient. This is because both generators and energy retailers will have a 
direct revenue interest in getting end-users to increase their electricity consumption, and 'wires' 
companies are unlikely to be interested, except where it may postpone the need to upgrade a 
specific section of the network. Some companies may allocate some funds to energy efficiency 
for marketing reasons, but in such instances the aim would be to maximise the publicity impact 
rather than the real impact. Against this background, investment in DSM that has public good 
characteristics will need to increasingly become an issue to be dealt with at a policy level. To 
ensure that such DSM takes place, the government would have to decide on appropriate policy 
with regards to (a) what should be done, (b) how it should be paid for, and (c) who should do 
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it. Some of the options available to government have already been noted in the preceding 
section. (See Clark and Mavhungu {2000) for more details on these measures.) 
6. Conclusion 
6.1 Overview of the main impacts of restructuring on DSM 
Table 5 presents an overview of the main impacts that the different scenarios for restructuring 
the electricity industry are likely to have on DSM. 
Status quo scenario 
The integrated structure of 
the utility should foster 
investment in all types of 
DSM since the utility as a 
whole would be able to 
internalise all the benefits. 
The supply side 
orientation of Eskom 
hinders investment in 
DSM. 
Generation would tend to 
be a monopoly and so 
would be able to 
intemalise all the benefits 
arising from more efficient 
use of existing capacity. 
Low generation costs and 
the existence of excess 
capacity have proved to 
be major obstacles to 
DSM. 
Again the integrated 
structure of the utility 
allows transmission to 
benefit directly from DSM 
measures implemented by 
Eskom distribution. 
Cost plus tariffs and 
revenue interests of 
distributors can obstruct 
energy efficiency DSM but 
facilitate load shifting and 
interuptibility DSM. 
The main Impacts of restructuring on DSM 
REDs scenario Wholesale competition scenario 
Overall Impact 
Generation and 
transmission will have to 
contract REDs to 
undertake DSM on their 
behalf. 
REDs will be 'freed' to 
focus on electricity issues 
and so are likely to invest 
more in financially viable 
DSM measures, i.e. 
mainly load shifting and 
interuptibility DSM 
The break-up of the 
dominant utility to create a 
competitive wholesale 
market will result in the 
'capacity saving benefits' 
of DSM taking on 
'commons good' 
characteristics. As a result 
investment in all types of 




The dominant utility will 
continue to intemalise 
most of capacity saving 
benefits of DSM 
investments 
The uncertainty caused by 
the prospect of wholesale 
competition is likely to 
make generators hesitant 
to invest in DSM 
Generators' incentives to 
invest in DSM undermined 
by DSM becoming a 
'commons good'. 
Generators may seek to 
capture certain DSM 
investments by concluding 
long-term contracts with 
large consumers. 
Transmission 
The reduced number of 
distributors will simplify the 
process of contracting 
them to implement DSM 
The incentives for 
transmission to undertake 
DSM will remain much the 





The absence of price 
competition may facilitate 
DSM investment by REDs. 
The revenue interests will 
discourage investment in 
energy efficiency DSM. 
The threat of retail 
competition is likely to 
discourage REDs making 
further load management 
DSM investments. 
Table 5: The main Impacts of restructuring on DSM 
6.2 Restructuring to strengthen incentives for DSM 
Retail competition 
scenario 
The introduction of energy 
retailers may foster all 
types of DSM if the market 
is structured so as to 
encourage competition on 
the basis of differentiated 
energy services rather 
than simply energy prices. 
The incentives for 
generators to do DSM will 
still be plagued by the 
'commons good' problem. 
There may be more scope 
for generators to contract 
with energy retailers to 
capture the benefits of 
load shifting and 
interuptibility DSM 
measures. 
Incentives remain the 
same as in previous 
scenario. 
Customers can choose the 
type of energy service 
they want. This may 
encourage retailers to 
offer services that include 
the full range of DSM 
options. 
In many senses the analysis in the previous section represents a problem statement. By 
identifying what is likely to happen to DSM as restructuring progresses, it poses a number of 
challenges that need to be considered when defming the objectives of restructuring. These 
challenges can be framed as questions: 
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• What can be done to ensure that investment in DSM with public good characteristics, most 
notably energy efficiency, takes place? Where would the funding come from? Who would 
manage the funds and ensure they are used effectively? 
• What can be done to overcome the 'free-rider' problem associated with certain DSM 
investments taking on the 'commons good' characteristic of non-exclusivity? For instance, 
how can the separate generating companies be made to invest in DSM aimed at reducing 
system peaks in demand, rather than simply investing in additional generation capacity? 
• How should the . mechanism for determining the electricity price at the wholesale level be 
designed to ensure that the price includes the social cost of electricity use? This would be 
crucial if the price is to be an accurate signal of the resource cost of electricity consumption, 
and therefore a signal to end-users encouraging greater energy efficiency. 
• How should tariffs be structured so that they provide end-users with accurate information 
with which to evaluate the potential benefits of investing in energy efficiency and other 
DSM measures? 
• How should wheeling charges be designed to encourage 'wires' businesses to undertake 
appropriate DSM investments? This is based on the understanding that transmission 
capacity is a limited resource and needs to be priced as such; thus, when demand for 
transmission capacity begins to push the boundaries of supply the price should increase. 
• How can 'energy' businesses be encouraged to compete with each other on the basis of the 
energy services they offer customers, rather than simply on the basis of the price of 
electricity? 
• How can 'wires' businesses be encouraged to give explicit consideration to DSM when 
evaluating the need to upgrade a given transmission or distribution network? 
• How can the government facilitate the emergence of ESCOs that provide services with a 
strong DSM content? 
In some instances, the discussion in sections 4 and 5 began to explore options for addressing 
some of these questions. This process of option analysis and the making of recommendations is 
the focus of the fourth and fifth report in this project series. 
Probably the most crucial area of intervention in ensuring DSM is well placed in the electricity 
industry contexts is to ensure that the restructuring process is designed in a way so as to foster 
incentives for DSM. Governments only embark on restructuring processes with a view to 
achieving a number of key objectives. These usually include the establishment of effective 
competition, the promotion of private sector participation in the ESI, the separation of the 
'wires' and 'energy' businesses, the promotion of economic growth, the restructuring of 
regulatory mechanisms and so forth. It would be a significant step forward, if the government 
were to identify 'the promotion of DSM' as a key objective of restructuring as well. This would 
place it alongside the other objectives that the government would take into consideration when 
designing and implementing the restructuring of the ESI. 
Identifying the promotion of DSM as one of key objectives of restructuring the ESI would 
require that special attention be given to resolving the challenges raised by the above questions. 
This is likely to entail giving explicit consideration to DSM in the design, planning and 
implementation of the restructuring process. 
ENERGY & DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE 
Expioring possible impacts of ESI restructuring on DSM 26 
REFERENCES 
Alberts, E., (unpublished) 'Local IEP (LIEP): Report on visits to regions', internal Eskom. 1 March 1999. 
Barberton, C., 1998. 'Restructuring the electricity distribution industry: An analysis of the proposed ownership 
and governance structures of regional electricity distributors', Development Southern Africa. 15(3). 
Barberton, C., 1999. Restructuring the electricity generation industry: Factors likely to impact on environmental 
performance. Report for the World Wildlife Fund Project on Macroeconomic Reforms and Sustainable 
Development in Southern Africa. Energy and Development Research Centre, University of Cape Town. 
Barberton, C., 2000. The structure of the electricity generation industry in South Africa: Options for the future. 
Research paper, Applied Fiscal Research Centre, University of Cape Town. 
Clark, A, 1999. Demand-side management in restructured electricity industries: An international review. 
Research report. Energy and Development Research Centre, University of Cape Town. 
Clark, A & Barberton, C., 1999. Barriers inhibiting investment in demand-side management in South Africa. 
Research report, Energy and Development Research Centre, University of Cape Town. 
Clark, A. & Mavhungu, J., 2000. Promoting public-benefit energy efficiency investment in new power contexts 
in South Africa. Research report. Energy and Development Research Centre, University of Cape Town. 
Department of Minerals and Energy (DME), 1998. White Paper on Energy Policy for South Africa. Pretoria: 
Department of Minerals & Energy. 
Department of Minerals and Energy (DME), 1998. Call for proposals on technical advisory servises to support 
EDI to support EDI restructuring. Government of South Africa, Pretoria. 
Hunt, S & Shuttleworth, G, 1996. Competition and choice in electricity. London: Bookcraft. 
National Electricity Regulator (NER), 1996a. Report of the Electricity Market Task Team: Options available to 
the South African Electricity Industry for the introduction of an electricity market, July. 
National Electricity Regulator (NER), 1996b. Report of the Large Customer Task Team of the National 
Electricity Regulator, October. 
National Electricity Regulator (NER), 1998. Electricity Supply Statistics for South Africa 1998 
Stephen, R. (unpublished) 'Local IEP- A Distribution Perspective', internal Eskom report dated 3 March 1999. 
Swisher, J., 1999. 'The Use of Area-Specific Utility Costs to Target Intensive DSM Campaigns', Ren Orans, 
Energy and Environmental Economics. 
ENERGY &DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE 
L 
f. 
EDRC REPORT SERIES 
